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POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVER BASIN
COOPERATION AND MANAGEMENT*
by DAVID LeMARQUAND**

The distinguishing feature of international rivers is the politics of
their use and management. The hydrology of a river does not change
when an international frontier runs across or along it, only the
politics change. Demands on the resource differ between basin countries due to many factors including population growth, economic
development, cultural practices, foreign policy objectives and the
availability and accessibility of other domestic water sources. These
create vastly different priorities for the river's use and obscure the
water resource planner's view of the basin as a hydrological unity. Ill
feelings between neighbors can further obscure the hydrological
perspective. These differences form barriers to cooperation that are
often more difficult to remove than physical obstacles.
Throughout the world it is becoming of greater importance to
remove these barriers, for the demands on water supplies and the
services water can provide are increasing dramatically as the world
population rises and the drive for economic development accelerates.
Since international rivers constitute a significant portion of the
supply, 1 much greater attention must be given to priorities for the
management of international freshwaters to supplement domestic
supplies and meet the needs for economic development and environmental quality. Failure of the basin countries to work together leads
to waste and environmental degradation and can raise tension between countries.
Many river basin institutions are functioning, and much international work has gone into providing plans for the use and management of international rivers, yet the results have not equaled the
efforts. Many of the problems are political, beyond the planners'
control; there are no easy solutions to improve this performance.
*This paper is extracted from a larger work by the author on international river basin
cooperation to be published by the Westwater Research Center in 1976.
**Research Associate, Westwater Research Center, University of British Columbia.
1. The U.N. identifies over 200 main stem international rivers and points out most
non-island countries share part of their freshwater resources with one or more countries.
U.N. ECOSOC, Comm. on Natural Resources, Developments in the Field of Natural Resources-Water, Energy and Minerals; Technical and Economic Aspects of International
River Basin Development: Report of the Secretary General, 3d Sess., New Delhi, 12-23 Feb.
1973, Item 8(c) of the provisional agenda, U.N. Doc. E/C 7/35 (1972).
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Despite this constraint progress can be made by establishing the
technical and political preconditions for cooperation. This requires
some appreciation of the factors that promote cooperation and those
that hinder it. This paper points out many of those factors to illustrate some conditions favorable for cooperation, for the operation of
effective international basin organizations, and for more responsive
.domestic and international planning of shared water resources.
HYDROLOGIC-ECONOMIC FACTORS
The river orders relationships between the basin countries. It is the
medium by which effects of actions taken in one country, such as
water abstraction, flow regulation of waste discharges, are transported to other basin countries. If each country is viewed as an
economic unit the physical effects generated in a country that it
passes on, through a river, to a neighbor can be regarded as externalities. Dorfman writes: "an externality occurs whenever an action
taken by some economic unit has a direct impact on the welfare or
productivity of some other economic unit." 2 When the medium
through which the external effect or externality is transmitted is
physical, that medium is a common property resource. 3 An international river is a common property resource shared among the basin
states for it transmits the externalities generated in one country to
another. All international rivers can be regarded as common property
resources.
Controversies over international rivers arise from questions concerning the distribution of externalities. The externalities may be
positive or negative and they also may be reciprocal or unidirectional. No neat formula derived from common property theory can
be used to classify these controversies. However, four issue areas can
be identified which appear to cover most international river controversies.' These are: public goods, common pool resource, integrated development, and upstream-downstream conflict issues.
Public Goods
Public goods are those goods or services to which each unit, in
this case country, has equal access; no one unit can exclude another
from enjoying the benefits of the resource; and, finally, the use of
the resource by one country does not detract from the benefits
2. Dorfman, The Technical Basis for Decision Making, The Governance of Common
Property Resources 5 (E. T. Haefele ed. 1974).

3. Id. at 7.
4. The following taxonomy was suggested by Irving K. Fox.
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enjoyed by the other. Use of the air and navigation on the high seas
are examples.
Pure public goods do not exist on international rivers since a
riparian country can generally exclude outside countries and use by
one country can impair the benefits enjoyed by another. Nevertheless agreements can establish "public good like" conditions, especially for navigation. An agreement permitting unrestricted access for
navigation on a river to other basin and outside countries affirms the
right of open or free transit, i.e. non-exclusiveness. The incentive to
reach such agreement is strong. Increased access and trade benefit all
nations without detriment to each other. Each nation profits at little
cost to itself and without diminishing the value of the common
property resource.
Navigation agreements on international rivers have been one of the
earliest and most successful forms of international cooperation.'
However, if shipping increases so that congestion becomes a problem,
further agreement may be needed to regulate what then becomes a
common pool resource. In recent times increased access has been
accompanied by physical works such as canalization. Agreements to
construct works are examples of integrated developments.
Common Pool Resources
There is significant incentive for agreement for common pool
resource issues. These have the same characteristics as the public
goods case except that use of the common property resource by one
country diminishes benefits to the others, or in some cases such as
pollution abatement by one country, provides increased benefits to
the other basin countries. Common pool problems most often occur
with boundary rivers or lakes when the countries sharing them dispose of waste, withdraw water or do something else with them that
has harmful effects on all the countries sharing them. The end result
is much like Hardin's case, the "tragedy of the commons," which
describes the actions of sheep owners using common grazing land.6
In the international rivers case each riparian has an incentive to
appropriate the waste assimilative capacity of a watercourse or the
water itself in order to increase its own benefits. As long as the costs
5. Peace treaties signed between Austria and Turkey as early as 1616 established navigation rights for the Danube. Similar treaties were signed for the Rhine between France and
Germany from 1697. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 following on a 1792 French proclamation established the principle of freedom of navigation on international rivers. The
principle formed the basis of several subsequent treaties, including ones for the Rhine and
Danube. See L. Teclaff, The River Basin in History and Law 59 (1967); Mance, International River and Canal Transport 1 (1944).

6. G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
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are not borne by a country in proportion to the use it makes of the
resource, the river will be depleted or seriously damaged.
The incentive to reach agreement is to avoid the "tragedy of the
commons." In the sheep herders case the problem of agreement is
more difficult to resolve as the number of herders may be large. The
marginal cost in terms of ultimate destruction of the resource attributable to each herder increasing his flock and over-grazing the commons is not charged to him, and thus the incentive to agree on
regulation is minimal. However, when the number of users is small, as
in the case for most international rivers where seldom more than two
countries share a common pool watercourse, the incentive for collective action is greater. The incremental costs felt by each riparian
from their own and the other countries' harmful actions are larger
and more apparent. Hence the benefits from reaching agreement are
more significant to each user. Also, when there is a small number of
countries, coordination and implementation of agreement is less
difficult. The progress being made in the cleanup of a number of
international lakes such as Lake Geneva, Lake of Constance and the
Great Lakes come to mind as examples of common pool cleanup
operations.
IntegratedDevelopment Opportunities
Integrated development of an international river can increase the
benefits from use of the river to basin countries over the benefits
from national development of the river. Combined development will
often have economies of scale which means that the net benefits
either country can achieve through independent action will be less
than through cooperative effort. Dams for flood control and power
production are most typical of this type of development. The
motivation of the upstream country to reach agreement is obvious.
Regulation of a river will generally provide external benefits downstream for flood control and power for which it will not receive
compensation unless there is agreement. An upstream country may
be reluctant, in the first place, to go ahead with its projects unless it
can be assured of receiving some compensation for the uncaptured
benefits it would send downstream. Similarly, if a downstream
country thinks its upstream neighbor is not interested in recovering
external benefits and will build its project anyway, the downstream
country may have no motivation to accept agreement for it will
receive some benefit at no cost to itself. However, the more beneficial stream regulation is to the downstream country the more it may
wish to have some say in how the river will be regulated.
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Difficulties arise in working out an equitable division of costs and
benefits. This problem is further complicated by the wide range of
alternative schemes of development that can be drawn up for most
rivers, each of which entails a different distribution of benefits and
costs. Agreement on the Columbia River was bedeviled, for a long
time, by these types of problems before agreement could be reached
for an integrated upstream-downstream network of hydroelectric and
flood control projects.
A variant of the above situation is one in which a project located
in an upstream country is designed almost solely for the downstream
country. A dam in an upstream country or a reservoir extending
across a boundary into that country is characteristic of this situation.
The only incentive for cooperation is compensation of some kind
from the downstream country. Proposed reservoir development on
the Skagit River that would extend across the Canada-U.S. border is
an example.
Upstream-DownstreamConflict
There is no economic incentive for cooperation when an upstream
country uses an international river to the detriment of the downstream country and that country has no reciprocal power over the
upstream country. Consumptive use of the river's waters, irrigation,
flow regulation, and waste disposal by an upstream riparian are
examples of the all too common upstream-downstream conflicts.
A state that takes advantage of its favored position on a river has
no real economic incentive to alter its behavior. The fact that agreements are reached suggests that other factors may persuade a country
to cooperate. The willingness of the United States to desalt part of
the water it passes on to Mexico on the Colorado River is an example
of international cooperation despite a strong economic disincentive.
More common though is the salt problem on the Rhine where Dutch
and German efforts to get France to restrict severely the amount of
salt it dumps into the river have shown limited results.
These four situations establish only a general pattern of incentives
and disincentives for cooperation. The incentives to work towards
cooperation for a specific international river may be modified by
additional water resource considerations. First, between riparian
countries more than one type of situation may exist on a river as it
flows between and through the basin countries. At one point an
upstream-downstream situation may prevail whereas at another point
the river may form the boundary. This variation complicates the
pattern of incentives. Second, the intensity of water use and interest
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in developing or protecting a shared water resource can vary between
countries. For one country, such as Germany on the Rhine, the river
may be central to the nation's economic, and even cultural and historical life, while for a neighboring country like France, the river
may be only of strategic importance. These different attitudes can
upset the economic incentives for cooperation. In a common pool
situation one country may be totally unconcerned about the assimilative capacity of a shared river or lake while its neighbor is
vitally concerned. Where this discrepancy in attitude exists the
situation becomes similar to the upstream-downstream conflicts in
that one country has no desire or incentive to reach agreement.
Third, a particular river may be only one of many international rivers
flowing through or between the two neighboring countries. Thus
national governments may have to develop a policy for a single river
in light of the policies it has for its other international rivers.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The spectrum of international political objectives countries hold
range from specific strategic imperatives necessary for national selfpreservation to ethereal goals of a desired world order. International
river issues tend to fall in the "middle range of objectives." These
objectives are generally concerned with satisfying domestic, social
and economic demands through international agreement, or maintaining amicable relations with neighboring countries.7 This is not
always the case. International rivers agreements may work to
legitimize new frontiers. Agreements that provide for recognition of
a river as a boundary or even make provision for future cooperative
use of a shared resource may have little to do with the river; rather,
they may establish, in international law, a new boundary. They may
thus help meet "core objectives" regarding a country's territorial
integrity. This is especially common after wars.' Under more stable
conditions, however, international rivers agreements are more concerned with substantive solutions to problems associated with a
shared resource than with using the agreement as a vehicle to reinforce territorial claims.
Since most international river issues are concerned with middle
range objectives that are not essential to national survival, policy for
7. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework For Analysis 135-136 (1967).
8. Note, U.N. Legal ProblemsRelating to the Utilizationand Use of InternationalRivers:
Report of the Secretary General, A/5409 (15 April 1963) Vol. I to III, the large number of
international river agreements that were signed after major domestic and international
political upheavals. U.N. Doc. A/5409 (1963).
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these issues is moderate. As the Colorado example indicates other
than economic reasons may determine policy. A range of international and domestic constraints and incentives shapes the final
outcome of national policy. This section discusses five international
relations factors that can contribute to national policy. These factors
may either back up the hydrologic-economic motivations for a policy
or they may work against them.
Image
The image a country wishes to project can be important. The
desire to pursue a good neighbor policy, to be a model of cooperative
international behavior, or to be candidly egocentric are examples of
national attitudes which may positively or negatively influence a
country's willingness to cooperate with its riparian neighbors.
Morgenthau comments that making a favorable impression on the
public opinion in another country "may be an important or even
decisive weight, as compared with all the other factors to be considered in the formulation of a foreign policy." 9
The concern for national image would appear to be significant in
influencing the United States to agree in 1971 to build a desalting
plant to treat irrigation drainage waters flowing to Mexico. There was
little Mexico could do to convince the United States that it should
improve the quality of the water it delivered. Purification of the
water was highly uneconomic and dilution of the water was politically unacceptable to the seven Colorado River basin states. Also,
the United States government argued that with the remedial works it
had already constructed to improve the quality of the water since
1965 its position was, for the most part, defensible in international
law.' 0 Nevertheless, the United States opted for agreement and
chose the uneconomic alternative of a desalting plant. (Uneconomic
in the sense that the cost of the water produced would be far in
excess of the cost of water that could normally be justified for use in
agriculture.)'I It felt that by pursuing its own self-interest, even
though justified, it would damage its relations with Mexico, and it
would project to the rest of Latin America and the Third World the
image of a strong powerful country which pursues its national interest heedless of the consequences to its poorer neighbor.
9. Morgenthau, Is World Public Opinion a Myth? N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1962 (magazine)
at 127.
10. See Gantz, United States Approaches to the Salinity Problems on the Colorado, 12
Nat. Res. J. 496 (1972).
11. For a full discussion see Martin, Economic Magnitudes and Economic Alternatives in
Lower Basin Use of Colorado River Water, 15 Nat. Res. J. 229 (1975).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 16

InternationalLaw
Closely related to a nation's image is its attitude towards international law. In the absence of a strong sovereign international authority
countries are tempted to ignore international law, or use one of the
many legal principles to justify their actions when prevailing legal
opinion conflicts with self-interest. They adopt legal and diplomatic
arguments that are most advantageous to their interests and objectives.' 2 Policy is more likely to be influenced by the country's position within the basin than by international law. The only constraint
imposed on national policy is the fear of setting unfavorable precedents in further dealings with neighboring countries and the disapproval of the international community. To illustrate, the United
States, which espoused the Harmon Doctrine in its dealings with
Mexico over use of the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers in the last
century, did not pursue the Doctrine in further negotiations with
Mexico and Canada where for many rivers, including the Lower Rio
Grande, it was a downstream country.1 3
Against this background there tends to be an international legal
consensus on principles applicable to international rivers. Traditionally four theories governing the use of international rivers have
been discussed: (1) the above mentioned Harmon Doctrine which
advocates absolute sovereignty to upper riparians, (2) absolute territorial integrity which guarantees, to the lower riparian, use of the
river in an unaltered state, (3) drainage basin development, or the
community theory, which stresses mutual development of a river's
waters by all riparian states, (4) the limited territorial sovereignty, or
equitable utilization theory, which permits use of a river's waters to
the extent of doing no harm to other riparian countries. This last
theory has become the most widely advocated by the international
legal community, as evidenced by treaties, judicial decisions, academics, and international bodies.1 4 International environmental law
supports this principle through its emphasis on liability. The Stockholm Conference's principles 21 and 22 stress non-detrimental use of
shared environmental resources and liability for polluting countries.
There is also widespread support for the polluter pays principle
which tends to support the equitable utilization principle.'
12. Holsti, supra note 7, at 392.
13. A. Garretson, The Law of International Drainage Basins 20-28 (1967).
14. Utton, InternationalWater Quality Laws, 13 Nat. Res. J. 282, 295 (1973).
15. See OECD Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, Section 16 (14 Nov. 1974),
which calls for international agreements that strive for "efficient pollution prevention and
control measures in accordance with the Polluter Pays Principle."
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Despite the apparent consensus, the equitable utilization and
related supporting principles do not provide a clear-cut guideline for
international agreement that can overcome a country's disinclination
to accept agreement on what it feels may be unfavorable terms.
Muraro writes, regarding the polluter pays principle, that "Since it is
advocated by international law and there is a growing moral pressure
for its implementation, the polluted country is rational in refusing to
accept the opposite principle." 1 6 And, the polluter has a strong
incentive to reject the principle since it would require the polluting
country to abate its discharges at its own expense for its neighbors'
benefit. The result is an impass or compromise in which international
law provides only the initial negotiation position of the victim
country, not the basis for a final settlement.
Linkage
Agreement with a neighbor for an international river scheme that
the neighbor wants may be used to gain concessions for other bilateral issues such as favorable trade arrangements or support for
some multilateral policy. These linkages between policy areas, Holsti
suggests, may be typical of countries where a high level of conflict is
characteristic. In countries where relations are well-established and
where there is a tradition of easy communication, such as between
Canada and the United States, "issue area isolation" is more common
in negotiation.1 7 Nonetheless, even between countries where there
are few explicit tradeoffs, a more undefined type of linkage consideration may remain important. One country may desire to build
up a "reservoir of good will" to draw on when it needs support or a
concession from its neighbor for a policy of greater national interest.
This factor was no doubt influential in persuading the United States
to go along with the Columbia River Treaty when it felt it could do
better.' 8 There were a number of outstanding issues between Canada
and the United States at the time for which the United States sought
Canadian support. Signing the Treaty was a means to build up in
Canada a favorable sentiment to United States' policies.
16. Muraro, Economic Aspects of Upstream.DownstreamTransfrontier Pollution, Problems in Transfrontier Pollution: Record of a OECD Seminar 62 (1972).
17. Holsti and Levy, Bilateral Institutions and Trans-GovernmentalRelations Between
Canadaand the United States, 28 Int'l. Organization 885 (1974).
18. Columbia River Treaty, 33 Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, ist Sess. (March 8, 1964). Ivan White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State stated one of the objectives of the United States was to reduce power costs to
British Columbia for "we regard Canada as a partner in the free world, and its growth, its
economic growth, as being important to the United States."
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Reciprocity
The desire for mutual commitment and obligation can often color
the thinking behind national policy against agreement, particularly
where there is no reciprocal distribution of benefits and costs as with
upstream-downstream issues. One country may object to an international water resource agreement if it must make the sacrifices
while the benefits are passed on downstream at no cost or obligation
to the downstream country. Switzerland, for example, was at first
reluctant to discuss the Council of Europe's proposed Convention for
the Protection of International Watercourses Against Pollution unless
the scope of the Convention was extended to cover pollution of
coastal areas, an issue not likely to affect in any way that landlocked
country. It felt that as a landlocked country it would have to make
great sacrifices for the benefit of downstream riparian coastal countries, like the Netherlands, which could continue to pollut its coastal
streams and coastline. Economic, as well as the psychological,
motivation for reciprocity is important. A discrepancy in pollution
abatement requirements for industry between countries may give one
country a competitive advantage in world trade.
Sovereignty
A final international relations factor influencing national policy is
a country's natural reluctance to enter into an international agreement. Any agreement to some extent limits a nation's flexibility and,
thus, reduces its sovereignty. If all other factors were equal a country
would presumably choose independent action over international
cooperation. This sovereignty consideration is similar to Ruggie's
interdependence cost which he defines as "the general loss of independence or loss of control over one's own activities, resulting
from the accumulation of collective constraints."'' 9 The hypothesis
Ruggie draws from this discussion on the propensity for international
organization can apply equally well to international agreements. That
is the propensity for international organization or agreement "will be
determined by the interplay between the need to become dependent
on others for the performance of specific tasks, and the general
desire to keep such dependence to a minimum level." 2
The concern for sovereignty may be strengthened by a country's
own nationalism, by bad historical relations with the basin states, by
unreliable and unstable riparian neighbors and by the importance the
19. Ruggie, Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration 66 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 878 (1972).
20. Id. at 878.

October 197

INTERNATIONAL RIVER BASINS

nation attaches to erosion of its national sovereignty. The Indus
River Treaty is an example of how all these factors come into play,
in a perverse way, as the motivation for agreement. The Treaty provided for the division, at great expense, of the complex Indus tributary and irrigation canal network, which existed between India and
Pakistan, so that neither country had to depend on waters flowing
from the other.
The concern for sovereignty is a major obstacle in the way of
integrated international river development. Confidence must be felt
between neighbors before they are willing to commit treasured
natural resources to interdependent development and management.
Even where trust is greatest, as it is between Canada and the United
States, recurring doubts and changing economic conditions may
threaten established agreements. For five years, Canada has been
attempting to put aside a long standing agreement with the United
States to flood the Skagit Valley in western Canada. Potentially more
serious is the erosion of Canadian support for the Columbia River
Treaty, as Canadians come to question the interdependent pattern of
river basin development and the net economic benefit they receive,
to which they are irrevocably committed.
The above influences are presented as discrete, but in reality they
tend to blend together. Image, linkage and international law may be
particularly difficult to disaggregate. For example, to return to the
Colorado salinity problem, United States policy appears to have been
strongly shaped by the poor image it would project in Latin America
and the developing countries but equally strong was the desire to
build up a "reservoir of goodwill" with Mexico to facilitate cooperation on other difficult bilateral issues at the time including trade
relations, immigrant farm labor problems, and control of illegal drugs
entering the United States from Mexico. Also, even though the
United States felt confident in its legal arguments, it could not be
sure other countries would respect them. Thus, in the examination of
specific controversies it may be difficult to distinguish clearly in
policy formulation where one influence leaves off and another
begins.
CLIMATE FOR AGREEMENT
The international relations factor help form national policy but
the success of the policy in the international arena may depend
greatly on the conditions that exist between the basin countries to
permit ease of communication. Scott suggests four types of favorable
conditions that can exist between basin countries: (1) countries with
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the same technical perception of a problem; (2) similar tastes for
goods and services such as environmental quality or river basin
development; (3) the use of the same technologies for production
where water quality is an issue; (4) although difficult to define, the
existence of an extensive network of transnational and transgovernmental contacts between countries.2 The use of a common language
can be added as a fifth point.
Russell and Sullivan in a discussion of international common
property resources imply three more conditions: (1) the participation of a small number of countries; (2) the desire of one large
country to have an agreement in which the proportionate cost of
providing more than its share of the costs entailed in an agreement
would be less than the proportionate costs of a small country providing only its share; (3) the necessary development by one country
of a good or service for its own use which may benefit other
countries. 2 2 The extent to which the above conditions are present or
missing.will strongly influence the climate for agreement.
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS POLICY-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION
Hydrologic-economic and international relations considerations in
part influence a nation's policy towards cooperation on its international watercourses. Policy-making within the national government
and the reconciliation of competing interests in society are important
further considerations.
Policy may be advanced from any number of different sources,
such as interest groups, parliamentary committees, political leaders,
and government departments singly or in combination. For this
analysis three types of policy making are distinguished: (1) policy
coming from the national bureaucracy without strong political guidance; (2) policy formulated with the active participation and support
of the political leadership; (3) non-executive policy-making, i.e.
policy, or perhaps more accurately, political demands originating from
other levels of government, interest groups or legislative bodies. The
feasibility of international agreement may be, to a large degree,
determined by the background from which the policy emerges.
Where the political leadership in the basin countries support cooperation, obstacles hindering agreement are easier to overcome. More
common, however, is bureaucratic policy formulation which more
21. Scott, Fisheries,Pollution and Canadian-American TansnationalRelations 28 Int'l.
Organization 841-844 (1974).
22. Russell and Sullivan, Collective Goods and International Organization, 25 Int'l.

Organization (1971).
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accurately characterizes water resource politics in general and international river policy formulation in particular. Policy demands
originating from non-executive organizations are likely to be present
in most controversies. Where non-executive groups do not support
the policy of the top political levels or the bureaucracy, domestic
political conflict will result which may determine the content and
domestic political feasibility of the policy that prevails, depending on
the power and influence of the opposition.
BureaucraticPolicy Formulation
Water resource issues for particular rivers are normally of regional
concern. National political leadership generally is reluctant to step
into parochial issues. Their interest is in the broader issues affecting
the whole country, and they have little to gain by getting entangled
in contentious regional issues.
International rivers have an important national interest dimension;
nevertheless international river problems are often of only regional
interest, especially in developed countries where any single water
resource development generally has minor impact on the economy.
Typically the foreign affairs department is left alone to represent the
national interest in an issue with minor direction from the cabinet
level. However, solutions to any international river problem will
generally require the active participation and commitment of resources from a number of other government departments such as
justice, finance, water resources, public works and environment.
Each department is one among equals. The foreign affairs department, which must coordinate and take the lead in initiating policy,
has no more power than the other departments. In fact it may have
less. Other departments have substantive jurisdictions and often interest group support, whereas a foreign affairs department has little
outside support and is dependent on the other departments for technical expertise and the resources to implement policy. Without
strong direction from above, the foreign affairs department is severely restricted in the policy options it can pursue. It is not likely to
get the material or jurisdictional support it needs from other departments. Without the political decision being first made at the highest
levels, the other departments can not make the political decision to
commit resources to foreign affairs or establish a new departmental
precedent. The foreign affairs department will be forced to follow a
policy that requires the minimum commitment from other departments, most likely a legalistic one that does little to offer constructive proposals for negotiation. Negotiations between governments
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may drag on for years. Agreement results from attrition when all
bureaucratic processes have been exhausted and internal consensus
achieved or when the national leadership finally takes an active interest. Thus, where the political leaders do not participate lowest
common denominator agreements are the most likely outcome.
Executive Policy Formulation
A president or prime minister may take an active role in an international river issue if the river is of vital national importance, some
principle or precedent of national interest is involved, the cabinet is
split, or a neighboring country has escalated the issue to one of
outstanding importance between the countries. Where there is a
strong commitment by the national leadership to cooperate, the
negotiators will have the authority to make the compromises necessary to reach agreement or at least develop a flexible bargaining
strategy. With support from the political leadership, the foreign
affairs department, which typically is charged with implementing the
policy, can exact from the other government departments concessions needed to ensure that the policy can be implemented. Also, the
coordinating and implementing agency can deflect interest group
criticism to the national political leaders.
Mexico broke the deadlock on the Colorado salinity issue in spite
of the constraints which limited the alternatives the U.S. Department
of State could offer. In 1972 President Echeverria went to Washington on a state visit and declared to Congress and President Nixon
that the salinity issue was the "most delicate problem between our
two countries." The effect was immediate. The President appointed a
respected former Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, to investigate
and propose a definitive remedy to the problem. He was not constrained by departmental biases and he had the support of the President. He recommended the desalting plant, a solution that would
normally have been vetoed by at least one department, in this case,
the Office of Management and the Budget. In just over a year, a
problem that had been in the bureaucratic mill for eleven years with
no definitive solution in sight was resolved.
In the Colorado case, the salinity problem was of national importance to Mexico, and the President was willing to raise it as a
vital outstanding complaint against the United States. This forced the
United States, in view of its image and linkage objectives threatened
by Mexico's stand, to consider the issue of national importance.
However, the majority of international river controversies are seldom
of such significance that one side is willing to escalate the issue to a
high level of grievance.
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Non-executive Policy Formulation
Policy or political demands that emerge from non-executive
sources must be accommodated by the national governments.
Following from the work of Lowi,2 3 Mann has classified the politics
of water resources policy formulation into three categories-distributive, regulatory and redistributive. 2" These categories can be adopted
to illustrate the conflict and types of accommodation that are made
between non-executive groups and national governments to achieve a
national policy for an international river.
A. DistributivePolitics
Distributive politics are widely known as "pork barrel politics."
Mann describes this form of politics and policy formulation as the
"process of coalition building among local interests to achieve some
benefit from the public treasury. '"2 5 Typically, for water resources,
local political interests will work to develop a unified proposal for a
project in the region such as a dam for hydro power or irrigation.
The local representatives in the national legislature will then seek
approval from the legislature for the national government to fund or
construct the project. To get support for the project the regional
representatives will support other projects (which may or may not
involve water) that the members from outside the region seek for
their own region, in return for their support. The only real losers in
the process are the treasury and those people advocating fiscal restraint. As a result, Mann comments, there is a "relative lack of
confrontation between those who gain and those who lose as a result
of the adoption of the proposal." '2 6 Also in the "log rolling" to
achieve consensus "there is very little in the way of 'policy' as an
outcome since each locality receives a benefit that is peculiar to
itself."2 7
For international river issues the highest level of coalition building
would be between two branches of government which need each
other's support for some particular objective. The same would hold
for two levels of government in a federal system, where each side
needs the cooperation of the other to implement policy. The provincial level typically will have responsibility over the resource in ques23. Lowi, FourSystems of Policy, Politics and Choice, 32 Pub. Ad. Rev. (1972).
24. Mann, Conflict and Coalition: Political Variables Underlying Water Resource
Development in the Upper Colorado Basin, 15 Nat. Res. J. 141 (1975).
25. Id. at 142.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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tion, while only the federal government can lead international
negotiations.
The accommodation between the United States Congress and
President Nixon over salinity control on the Colorado is an outstanding example of distributional accommodation. Congress supported the President's demand for a desalting plant to satisfy Mexico.
In return, the President did not veto Congress's basin-wide salinity
control program. Distributional accommodations provide a stable
basis for agreement as the potential opposition to agreement is coopted by receiving some benefit from agreement. Needless to say,
this type of policy formulation does not often satisfy economic
rationality.
B. Regulatory Politics
Regulatory politics sets the ground rules for directing behavior
within society. Whereas distributive politics solves political problems
by the increased expenditure of government funds to buy out the
opposition, regulatory politics is concerned with controlling behavior. It has the effect of raising costs and reducing or expanding
the alternatives open to individuals and groups.2 8 Conflicts over
establishing standards, guidelines, rules and criteria are the type of
political issues typical of regulatory politics.
Regulatory policies are more difficult to establish than distributive
ones because there are fairly well established winners and losers. The
losers may attempt to use the final decision as the basis for further
action to re-establish their own interests.' 9 The impact of the policy
is generally sectoral, as are the battlelines, e.g. environmental groups
vs. polluting industry, labor vs. industry, and interest groups vs.
government efforts to establish waste discharge and water quality
standards for international rivers. In Germany, for example, industrialists are allied to some provinces on the Rhine against the federal
government's domestic and international efforts to establish stiffer
basin-wide water quality regulations and standards.
C. RedistributivePolitics
Redistributive politics concern reallocation of wealth and income
or goods and services within a nation or control over resources between levels of government. Thus broad classes of people come into
conflict, often in ideological terms, over how the wealth of a society
28. T. Lowi, Distribution,Regulation, Redistribution: The Functions of Government, in
Public Policies and their Politics (Ripley ed. 1966).
29. Mann, supra note 24, at 142.
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should be distributed on such policies as income tax and welfare
programs. For the purpose of this international rivers discussion,
redistributive politics will be more widely defined to include those
controversies in which one group must give up something directly to
another group. This would include reallocation of water rights in a
river and the redistribution of authority between federal and provincial governments in federal state. A government that must settle a
domestic controversy of this nature before signing an international
agreement will have more'difficulty than one which is not facing
redistributive problems.
In federal systems, federal-provincial conflicts over international
rivers may not involve the water resource so much as the desire by
either level of government to secure authority over issue areas which
they feel ought to be within their own jurisdictions. For example,
the German federal government is suspected of using its authority as
a national representative in negotiation for multilateral water
resource conventions as a means to extend its control into the states'
jurisdiction over water pollution control.
CONCLUSIONS
There is no easy way to remove the barriers to international river
basin cooperation. However, some conditions facilitate cooperation.
Where there is empathy and shared perceptions of problems between
countries, such as between Canada .and the United States, negotiations tend to be easier. If both countries can gain or lose by the
actions of the other there is a strong motivation to reach agreement.
Where competing interest groups within the basin countries can all
benefit from agreement through a distributional accommodation, the
prospect for getting domestic support for agreement will be much
better than if some powerful groups or regional authorities will have
to be regulated or make major concessions to meet the terms of the
agreement. Finally, if the chief executive of the basin countries can
be motivated to make a commitment to resolve the issues, definitive
and innovative solutions may be more easily accomplished than if
negotiations are left to the representatives of the government departments.
On the institutional level, international river basin organizations
can be most innovative and operate most effectively when there are
reciprocal interests in the outcome of the institution's work by the
basin countries. This is most likely in public goods, common pool,
and integrated development situations. Upstream-downstream situations will be the most restrictive. Two institutions within the Rhine
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basin illustrate the constraints on international organization. The
International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine Against
Pollution has only modest functional tasks, like data recording, and
no substantive independent authority. Only the Netherlands, among
the Commission's members, is willing to give up policy-making
authority to strengthen the Commission. The upstream countries do
not share the Netherland's commitment to a stronger river basin
organization, for they would lose some sovereignty in policy-making
with no appreciable offsetting benefits.
In contrast, where there are reciprocal benefits and interdependencies, basin states will forsake a limited degree of sovereignty.
Within the same basin the International Moselle Company is implementing complex navigation developments for the canalization of the
Moselle. The Company is one of a new breed of international organizations, an independent international public utility corporation. It
finances and coordinates construction of the works for its share
holders, the three basin countries-France, Luxembourg, and Germany. Its independence of action, in these integrative projects of
vital national interest to the three countries, illustrates the loss of
autonomy a basin country may tolerate when it has the same incentives as the other countries. Nevertheless, the restricted authority
granted the corporation shows that the countries are not willing to
extend jurisdiction very far from technical and functional activities
into areas that may have broader national policy implication.
The degree of interdependence necessary to achieve mutual objectives appears to set the limit to the authority an international basin
organization can have. Large scale interdependencies between basin
countries are rare, as one country generally will have some advantage
over the other. The favored country will reject proposals for the
creation of organizations that limit or reduce their flexibility in
making policy for the use of their share of the river. In poor countries it may be possible to create interdependence, where little exists,
by making technical and financial aid by donor organizations and
countries for river basin development contingent on the basin states
working out a unified policy. However, such a policy may be unacceptable since it could distort national development in one or more
countries away from high priority investments in other segments of
the economy into lower priority international basin developments.
On the operational level, planning for cooperative river basin use
may be misdirected if it pursues exclusively traditional planning
approaches of economic efficiency. Economic efficiency is seldom
the principal objective for management and use. As the Colorado
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salinity case illustrates, any number of objectives may be sought
from cooperation which have little to do with the impact of the
project on the national economy. Often, however, the political
leaders do not have the information needed to assess proposed
cooperative schemes in terms of the non-economic objectives they
hold. Without a full understanding of the consequences of interest to
them from accepting particular alternatives they may be reluctant to
commit their countries to an agreement. Thought needs to be given
to the types of planning strategies that would be appropriate to the
political reality within the basin and the information requirements of
the negotiators and political leaders. At this point it is enough to
suggest that planning must provide the information and assessments
on the consequences of pursuing alternatives in terms of the range of
objectives held by the national political leaders. This approach
should bring into the open the political obstacles that may be hindering agreement to enlighten both domestic and international debate
on the advantages of the cooperative use and management of international rivers.

